Planning for Safe & Secure Ground Transportation Success – The SECRETS of Ground Transportation – Part 2

If you’re reading this article because you saw the word “Secret” in the title and thought you’d be seeing something that no one else knows, stop reading now. There are no Secrets in anything we do in Protective Operations at this level. It’s only consistent training and hard work. While much, if not all this article will be used in someone else’s training PowerPoint for a “nominal” fee, nothing is secret and it’s absolutely free. In Part I of this article on planning and managing one of the most critical components of any protective detail, safe and secure ground transportation, we focused on two equally important components of the logistics and transportation aspects of a successful protective detail – Security Driver and Vehicle selection, while sprinkling in some “salt & pepper” (i.e. lessons learned, hacks, and tips for addressing the challenges that  the detail leader, protection manager, Security Driver or protection practitioner is likely to face when planning for a movement, or series of movements by vehicle).

So now that the foundation for success has been built, let’s build out the framework by taking a closer look at some of the more technical issues relating to Secure Transportation, which apply universally across most types of protective operations. As mentioned previously, but a point that is well worth repeating, ALL protection is based on a known or perceived threat. In turn, mitigating and managing that threat, requires a thorough protective advance.

This is about as close to an absolute truth in protection operations as you will hear. There is a reason for that, and it’s that conducting protective advances is a generally accepted “Best Practice.” Why does this one aspect of protection attract so much attention? Because the process of conducting a protective advance provides insights directly into the vulnerabilities and risks associated with the protection of your Protectee and considers resources and options that may be useful in mitigating those risks.

When it comes to providing safe and secure ground transportation, within the broader protective advance – which is sometimes referred to as “advance work” or “the advance” –  is where the detail leader or protection manager will find one of, if not the, most effective risk mitigation and management tools he or she has access to, the Route Advance and Route Survey. This is not to say that other aspects of the advance aren’t valuable, aren’t useful, or aren’t applicable.

Of course, they are; otherwise, those aspects, perhaps even the protective advance as a whole, would have been abandoned by professional protection practitioners a long time ago. However, with history pointing to the undeniable fact that if (always the operative word) the Protectee is subject to a serious and credible security threat, it is most likely to statistically happen when he or she is in or around their vehicle.  Logic dictates that planning for those times should be a priority.

What’s Old is …Still Old, But Valuable

While we are on the topic of universal truths, most of you already know your Protectee may accept protection but is bound and determined to live his or her life the way they see fit.  This lifestyle may not necessarily be the safest, or most secure, but you’re working for a reason. In fact, it’s entirely possible that the most difficult person to protect a Protectee from, may just be themselves. What does that even mean?

Well, for the purposes of this discussion, it means that despite suggestions and recommendations from those responsible for keeping them safe and secure, Protectees tend to be creatures of habit and predictability. For example, they may prefer eating at the same restaurants, on the same night, at the same time, and at the same table, week in and week out. Or they may insist on leaving the residence at the same time each day and taking a very specific route from the residence to the workplace or vice versa.

Even the least experienced protection practitioner, who graduated their first protection training course just a few minutes ago, should understand the risks this poses to both them and the Protectee, as predictability leads to increased vulnerability. After all, if the “bad guy/girl” knows where and when a Protectee will be somewhere with a high degree of certainty, the question on the professional Security Driver or other protection practitioner’s mind be “why wouldn’t they try something here”, as opposed to ignoring the potential risk.

Yet, just as there is a risk to predictable or habitual movements by the Protectee, there is a potential upside. However, that potential upside can only be fully realized if the practitioner or driver is regularly reviewing and updating the protective advance, especially the route plan. What upside could there possibly be to moving the Protectee to or from, and into and out of, the same locations time and time again?

The more frequently the location is visited, and the routes inspected, the more familiar protectors covering the Protectee should be with the normal levels of activity in and around those locations and along those routes. In turn, any changes, any unusual types of levels of activity, should be more easily recognizable by those doing the planning and providing the coverage.

With that in mind, all documentation pertaining to a previous protective advance, as well as the previous route plan, should be thoroughly reviewed. This is another “Best Practice” by reviewing historical files. When properly compiled and stored, this documentation will save significant time and effort when conducting the advance, while providing details regarding “issues” or “concerns” that may have arisen during previous movements to or from the locations in question.

The individual responsible for conducting the transportation advance and/or planning the routes should at least review:

• Previously completed contact lists and transportation resources
• Previous schedules and/or logistics documents
• Previously completed Route Surveys
• Previously completed Hospital Surveys
• Previously completed Airport/FBO advances

Routes are Like Potato Chips, You Can’t Have Just One

One of the core tenets of every transportation advance is the need to inspect all routes prior to any movement with the Protectee. This includes, of course, a Primary Route (which, as the title implies, is the “first choice” for the planned movement), Secondary Routes for use in the event that the primary route is not viable or is compromised and, if deemed appropriate, an alternate route (or multiple alternates, depending on the circumstances) for emergency purposes.

Regardless of any given route’s designation – primary, alternate, etc. – each of them should be as completely and thoroughly inspected as the primary route, and that can only be accomplished by “driving them.” If you’re interested in Google desk searches for route planning, you’re in the wrong field.

The goal in inspecting the routes, otherwise known as “Running the Routes”, is to identify potential hazards and risks, find ways to avoid them altogether and, if that’s simply not possible, to find ways to fully manage them. So, it stands to reason that routes should be driven at a day and time as close to that which the route will be traveled on with the Protectee. In a perfect world, given plenty of lead time and resource, the routes will be run during the exact same timeframe which they will be driven during the Protectee’s movement.

But just because we don’t work in a “perfect world”, and there isn’t much time from when the itinerary was received and the trip will actually take place, it doesn’t mean that the routes shouldn’t be run at all. Of course they should; though the practitioner performing the advance and running the routes may not be able to do so during the exact same timeframe, or even in the precise order of movements, he or she must invest the time and energy necessary to inspect the routes and gain as much of an understanding of the risks likely to be faced during a movement as possible, even if the timing isn’t perfect.

At a minimum, all routes should be recorded, preferably digitally to make it easier to share and store the information. Routes that should be surveyed include, at a minimum:

• Airport/FBO (Fixed Base Operator)
• Hotel/Residence/Remain Over Night (RON)
• All Sites/Venues to be visited
• Hospital Route (ER/Trauma Center entrance)
• Safe Havens/Safe Houses

When conducting Route Surveys, some of the risk factors that should be taken into considerations will include railway crossings, raised bridges, construction areas, school zones, speed bumps, and toll roadways (without automated tolls) to avoid unexpected delays and slowing of the movement. It’s also important to be as familiar as possible with local holidays and cultural events that may also impact your access to routes or the flow of traffic along them.

The Route Survey and selection process must also consider:

• choke points
• zones of predictability
• fatal funnels
• probable/likely attack vectors

One of the last and, perhaps, most important steps of the route planning process is route selection. Choosing the most appropriate Primary and Alternate route or routes requires training and experience that not every practitioner may have had the opportunity to develop yet. This is why who you select as being tasked with the transportation advance is an important consideration.

If your team uses contract drivers, it is imperative that time is built into your advance to spend familiarizing the driver or drivers with the selected routes. This also requires that the contract they are operating under provides for an appropriate amount of time prior to the Protectee’s arrival to do so.

Curbside? It Ain’t Over Yet.

The data captured in both the Rand Corporation’s Future Trends in Terrorism study, published in 1989, as well as that found in the book Just 2 Seconds by De Becker, Taylor, and Marquart, indicates that for most Protectee’s, the highest risk periods for them are those when they find themselves in or around their vehicle.

Which means that no matter how much time and energy we spend inspecting and selecting routes, special consideration and attention must be given during this process for where and how the Protectee will Arrive and Depart from whatever venue he or she may be visiting.

Some of those safety and security considerations may be risk driven while others may be driven by the Protectee’s desire to maintain a low profile or be anonymous. Still more considerations for Arrivals and Departures may be dictated by the venue and the environment. Regardless, the practitioner conducting the route advance is responsible for asking the right people the right questions.

Some, though certainly not all, of the special considerations for Arrivals and Departures include:

• Is the arrival/departure area covered? (tented, partially covered, underground)
• Is the arrival door (Protectee’s) onside (i.e. strong side) or offside (i.e. weak side)?
• Are there security personnel posted at the arrival/departure area?
• What are the line of site considerations, to the Protectee, during the exit and entrance into the vehicle?
• Is there media and public at the arrival/departure location and do they have unrestricted access to your arriving vehicles?
• What does the arrival/departure location look like and are there site dynamics or circumstances that require additional security mitigations before movements can be made?
• Are there additional security personnel available at the site/venue who can provide crowd control and communicate arrival dynamics before the Protectee’s vehicle or motorcade arrives?

Once the decision has been made regarding Primary, Secondary, and alternate drop off/pick up points – those exact locations where the Protectee will enter and exit the vehicle at – thought must be given to choreographing the Protectee’s movement. This holds true whether one is working as a Solo Practitioner while being supported by site security personnel, whether you are operating as part of a team with an additional practitioner waiting curbside for the Protectee, or a larger protective detail. The choreographed movement from the vehicle into, or out of, a venue requires the same basic tenets be applied – providing 360⁰ protective coverage – as would be applied to any other foot movement, with some additional security considerations.

One of the most important considerations involves managing the Protectee’s door at the vehicle. In fact, James Hamilton, an experienced, highly regarded protector, manager, and senior leader in the profession, recently wrote an article that appeared here in EP Wired on this very topic.

The question, which has been debated for decades among Security Drivers and protection practitioners is whether the Protectee’s door on the vehicle should be left open upon arrival until he or she is safely within another protective boundary, or if, upon departure, the door should be opened well in advance of the Protectee making their way to the vehicle?  In our opinions, Hamilton’s article was both detailed and correct in addressing this age-old question.

In fact, James’ article – and his opinion on the matter – are clearly illustrated by the video that has circulated on some social media platforms of Justin Bieber exiting a hotel to find he couldn’t enter his limousine, which was shut and locked.

To better understand why leaving the door open and “controlled” as the Protectee makes his or her way into a structure or some secured area of an outdoor venue, it must first be acknowledged that even when stationary the vehicle is a source of “cover”, or additional protection, in the event of a security incident during an Arrival or Departure. Just how much cover, or protection, the vehicle affords the Protectee depends on the type of vehicle.

Regardless of the year, make, and model of vehicle, as your Protectee leaves the vehicle, they are exposed for whatever length of time it takes for them to make their way to the “cover” of a venue. This period of exposure creates an ideal attack opportunity for any threat actor and a factor that contributes greatly to why a significant number of attacks take place in and around vehicles at Arrival and Departure areas.

It also serves to highlight that much of what we do as protectors, from both a planning and execution perspective, revolves around two critical elements: Time and Distance. We are always trying to put as much of both between any threat and our Protectee in everything we control. Considering the time and distance while exiting a vehicle, there is sufficient opportunity for an attack, which places increased emphasis on keeping the door open until your protectee enters the next security feature or reaches the next “cover”.

Here again, we must only look at recent events to understand the risks Protectees may face during Arrivals and Departures. One such incident, an attack on the Prime Minister of Canada, which was circumvented by his security detail, illustrates why the time between the vehicle and the venue should ALWAYS be limited to the smallest amount possible.  To the greatest extent possible, greetings by staff or others should NEVER take place outside and between the two points; keeping in mind, of course, the Golden Rule of Executive Protection.

This rule holds that the one with the gold (typically the Protectee) gets to make the rules …or call an audible to a well-thought out, seamlessly executed, protection plan.

This scenario also serves to highlight the value of a thorough protective advance conducted by a knowledgeable, experienced practitioner. If greeters are expected, as determined during the advance, arrangements to meet them inside the venue can be made well before the Protectee’s arrival and communicated effectively.

Looking at it through the lens of the worst-case scenario, if an attack were to take place at an Arrival/Departure point, the Detail Leader would have a split second to make a monumentally critical decision:

• Return to the cover of the vehicle and depart, or
• Move to the cover of the venue and seek additional security resources inside

If the door to the vehicle is closed, it significantly limits the decision-making process as covering and evacuating to the vehicle may not be a viable option if the door is already closed.

In the event of an attack on the Protectee (AOP), every millisecond counts. So having the door open creates an avenue for escape, and may offer the closest, fastest means of getting the Protectee to cover. Conversely, if the door is closed, the time needed to open the door may put the Protectee, and those protecting him or her, at a distinct disadvantage for time. Remember, you don’t know you’re going to be attaked and are acting “Reactively” to the threat. Proactive beats Reactive all day long.

Earlier this year there was online debate on LinkedIn by security professionals regarding the “open door” concept. Some pointed out that the open door creates other security issues ranging from thrown items to people entering the vehicle.

While those are certainly valid points, it’s important to remain focused on not just the threat, but the environment, and the totality of circumstances when considering just how likely, or unlikely, those scenarios are to occur. The ultimate target of any attack will ALWAYS be your Protectee, not the vehicle. If someone targets a vehicle, it’s most likely because your Protectee is in it or is believed to be in it, and once they have stopped the vehicle, or prevented it from moving, their attention will shift to the Protectee.

Simply put, when all things are considered, it makes sense to leave the vehicle door open and remember to get it open as soon as possible on departure.

No Protectee, No Risk, Right? Wrong!

One aspect of providing safe and secure transportation that often takes a back seat to planning and executing the movement of the Protectee, is the operational security protocols for the driver and vehicle, particularly those which should be in place when the Protectee is not in the vehicle.

As part of the “Driver Briefing”, the Transportation Advance agent or the practitioner who is overseeing the movement should always make a point to discuss vehicle security protocols. Some of the more common protocols for securing the Protectee’s vehicle may include, but not limited to:

• Vehicle doors should ALWAYS remain locked while moving.
• Vehicle windows should ALWAYS remain closed.
• Vehicles should always be parked in secured/controlled parking areas prior to and after use.
• Vehicles should be subject to a physical serviceability inspection prior to use.
• If the threat profile supports (and resources are available), Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM or “bug” sweeps) of vehicles should be conducted prior to transporting a Protectee.  The same applies to EOD K9 sweeps.
• If TSCM and/or K9 sweeps are performed, vehicles must be secured or physically monitored to prevent tampering after the fact.

What If….?

As a new agent in the Secret Service and standing for untold hours in some of the best stairwells and alleys in the world, a supervisor introduced me to the “What If’ game. He told me upon taking my post and guarding whatever door or hallway I was assigned, to spend the first five minutes considering every conceivable “bad” thing that could happen to me in that position.

So for five minutes, I considered medical emergencies, knife wielding ninjas, earthquakes, lost drunks, you name it.  Following the assignment, I worked the “what if” game into every position I held. As I progressed through my career, I realized that what my supervisor had subtly done was introduce me to the Advance Model of Protective Operations. “What If’s” are the focus of your mitigation efforts during every advance.

The same principle applies to Transportation Advance. The goal of the Transportation Advance is to reduce the risks the Protectee may face to the point that any residual risks are easily managed by the people and resources available. But what if, despite the time and energy you spent on identifying and mitigating threats, vulnerabilities, and risks, your Protectee is still targeted and attacked while moving in secure transport?

This is one “What If” which the protection practitioner developing the route advance survey can easily address by identifying Safe Havens/Safe Houses on the selected routes in the event of an emergency in transit or an Attack on the Protectee/Principal (AOP).

These locations, which are selected because they have additional security resources and communications capabilities on site, will typically include:

• Police Stations
• Fire Houses
• Hospitals, or EMS Stations
• Embassies, or other Government Facilities.

While this type of planning is often considered exigent for low threats, it’s the difference between “getting a ride” and being “protected” while moving by vehicle. One of the many good reasons for identifying a Safe Haven/Safe House for use during a planned movement is if an “unknown” substance (paint, blood, urine, fecal matter, chemical irritants, acid) was thrown on the limousine during transport.

In planning for such an incident, as rare as this may be, consideration must be given to things such as:

• How you intend to safely clean the vehicle before arriving at the next venue to avoid possible exposure of your Protectee to whatever unknown substance was thrown on the vehicle.
• Having a plan for decontamination built into the transportation advance (a pressurized hose located on site, or at a local Firehouse along the selected route.

When all is said and done, the ability to plan the safe, secure, and efficient movements of the Protectee, as well as conducting broader protective advances, is likely a large part of why you and your team were hired to provide protection in the first place. The reality is that while just about anyone can jump in the front seat of a limousine, wearing sunglasses and a ‘tacticool’ earpiece, it is the security professional who gets in with a purpose and a plan. As with most aspects of protection, the details matter, and the Transportation Advance, with all its smaller details, is one you and your protectee can’t simply afford to miss.

If you or your team is interested in further technical and protective advance information related to protective coverage or protective operations information like that listed in this article, take a look at the Board of Executive Protection Professionals (BEPP). The BEPP is setting a new standard for executive protection and provides important executive protection career information regularly.

Kevin Dye is a retired U.S. Secret Service supervisor with more than 28 years of experience providing protection at the highest levels of government and industry worldwide. 

Joe Autera has for the past 20 years, designed, developed, and delivered highly advanced security driving and secure transportation-related training programs to private and public sector clients in more than 36 countries on 6 continents.