EP Wired talks with Richard Aitch, Global Security Director and Author, about his book, his long-standing career, where the industry is, and where it could be going.
1. You said that the reason behind the book was to push the close protection standards forward because what was present wasn’t good enough. Since writing the book, how do you think the industry standards have changed, and how much more is there to go?
The purpose of writing the book was to actually highlight the pitiful state of the security industry, in particular, the CP sector. The first book, Close Protection, A Closer Observation of the Protection Equation, was published as a result of experiencing first-hand the blasé attitude towards Close Protection by the SIA, the Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation (Ofqual), Awarding Bodies, and other assisting organisations, together with a combination of both a frustration with the deplorable commercial training and operational standards on display, other publications on the subject, and a passion to strive for industry excellence in this elitist role.
The book subsequently went on to become the internationally leading publication on Close Protection, having been ordered by government protection units responsible for the protection of Presidents, Prime Ministers and Heads of State throughout the world, security departments of Embassies & Consulates and NATO HQ, Central Security and Protection Division/Centre for Knowledge & Expertise, The Hague, and commercial training providers for use as their training manuals and student reading. It has been used as a reference textbook by degree academics in the fields of criminology and security & risk management, ordered by academic, public, government, corporate, and specialist libraries, including the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), in addition to being translated into Arabic, with publication rights being acquired by The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research.
A decade later, in 2022, as a result of research and lobbying the Government throughout the previous 16 years, I have confirmed the SIA as being merely a vehicle to rationalise the obscene imposed by the United Kingdom’s Home Office, with their focus and priority of protecting the revenue in taxation the private security industry generates and to reduce the payments made by the Welfare State. I can also confirm that contrary to the instructions dictated by the Private Security Industry Act 2001, the SIA is a servant of the Home Office and, by design, must fully comply with its demands and remit. This book unearths the closed-door response when challenged by both the Home Office and the SIA; the failings of getting people into work using a specialist occupation as its mechanism; the reprehensible approach to the selection and training of private sector Close Protection operatives and the disastrous recognition of prior learning of those who conducted the role within a government service.
As a direct consequence, this book has been written to provide an investigation into the restrictions and limitations imposed on operational performance and the workaround solutions for best practise. From the lack of private sector industry entrance benchmarks to poor training, to poor contract service providers, to laws, to budgets, to Governments’ prying eyes, this book unearths and highlights the problems, difficulties, complications, and underhanded practises of the commercial Close Protection world, whilst providing the necessary solutions to maximise CP operations to an effective, workable, and professional state.
The aim of this book is to right the wrongs, to correct the methods of ‘best practise’ contrary to those stipulated by industry authorities, organisations, training/ service providers, and online/ offline commentary; to provide realistic, practical and effective advice concerning methods of operation and tactical doctrine to detect, confirm, identify and thwart any hostile action, whether the nature of it be technical, physical or socially engineered from tactics, techniques and procedures that have been both personally tried and tested in most countries and in all threat regions throughout the world.
The book is less concerned with those requirements of a red-carpet celebrity nature or those so often used as a ‘life-smoother’, but more aligned to the high-level international corporate world where real threats to life exist both direct and environmentally generic, and where the presence of UK and foreign government interest invokes operational practise not required or experienced at the lower end of typical CP provision. It is written from the perspective of a UK based BG/ CPO who undertakes ad-hoc operational deployment in both the UK and on foreign soil. The approach to tactics, techniques, and procedures, laws, equipment, and the very general nature of CP that remains the same regardless of your country of origin. Not as a conflict between real world versus textbook – but as a real-world textbook.
Ultimately, the two main issues I had with the SIA and their course in 2006, and outlined in the first edition in 2012, still remain: the lack of any industry entrance benchmarks – minimum age, minimum physical, medical, and mental fitness, and having held a driving licence for a minimum of 8 years – (thereby organically addressing the minimum age).
Since the first book in 2012, the industry has become far more informed over that period. This has been as a result of online and offline discussions on how to maximise operational performance, albeit not entirely as described. I would also like to believe that the industry, both in the UK and on the wider international scene, has benefited from reading the book and understanding what has and is going wrong and how to rectify it. I believe standards have improved, but certainly not to any fit-for-purpose level, but by way of piecemeal and lip service/ token gesture.
Commercially, courses will become a viable means to an end where business is concerned. The FREC 3 serves as a perfect example where students are taught certain medical administration that is unbalanced to the requirements within a typical Western operating environment, administration that requires regular training to counter skill fade, far more so than the 3-year re-training allows. Ultimately, the level of knowledge of best practice has improved over the years; this doesn’t necessarily translate into an actual increase in performance. Much is spoken about but very little undertaken, with contract service providers focusing mainly on a candidate’s ‘must-haves’ in terms of ‘FREC 3s’ and years’ experience as opposed to exposure to specific experience.
In regard to your last question: how much further to go – the answer can only be defined as to what is accepted as the point where industry entrance is concerned, or a proper pre-course selection process and a proper training course where the course itself is used as the extended form of selection; a proper pass/ fail, if you will. And for that, I doubt that will ever occur.
2. With 900 pages, 40 chapters, and multiple distinct parts, the book is essentially a definitive guide for close protection. What goes into approaching the writing process for a project like that, and is there something you would add or take out from the book 14 years on and after the second addition?
When I began writing, I began with the Table of Contents and used that as the platform to work down, adding chapters and content as I went along. There is absolutely nothing I would remove, as all of the content was and will be forevermore pertinent and relevant to protective security operations. Nowadays in the very present, additional subject matter would include the use of AI, which will fundamentally and drastically improve residential security via installed systems and also the collation of information. The use of drones would also be included as a relevant need.
3. Having gotten the book into libraries, training programs, and government units, are there any other avenues you feel could benefit from the knowledge inside? Is there something more you have in store for the book?
The Revised Edition expands on the first and continues to be ordered by various government departments as well as commercial organisations, including
- • Government protection units, operational and training, responsible for the protection of Presidents, Prime Ministers and Heads of State throughout the world
• Security companies and organisations worldwide
• Security departments of Embassies & Consulates and NATO HQ
• Police | Central Unit | Central Security and Protection Division | Centre for Knowledge & Expertise, The Hague
• Commercial training providers for use as their training manuals and student reading
• Used as a textbook by academics in the field of Criminology and Security & Risk Management degree studies
• Recommended and used as background reading for the Foundation Degree in Protective Security Management at Buckinghamshire New University
• Arabic translation & publication rights acquired by The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi
• Used as course literature on the 10-week Close Protection course of the Swedish Armed Forces
Sourced to provide books to academic, public, government, corporate and specialist libraries worldwide, including the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
Regarding whether I have anything more in store for the book, you will have to wait and see in about 6 years’ time!
4. You have headed up close protection and covert surveillance operations in more than 60 countries. You have also said that a team leader has their work cut out for them to ensure that the end-user receives a smooth service. What goes into assembling teams across the globe, and what do you look for when bringing an international team together?
I have recruited, selected, trained, and managed teams in China, Japan, Hong Kong, India, Russia, Australia, France, Germany, and many other countries, mainly for estate and residential security as opposed to actual CP. The delivery of CP in other countries I usually sourced via companies that would be recommended by the British Embassy or Consulate in that country, or using the same local provider they use.
In addition, I would conduct my own due diligence in terms of sitting down with the local company MDs to vet their answers to my questions and challenges. The same token applies to the provision of armoured vehicles and local armed attachments to my team. The use/ carriage of firearms is a bombastic paper move that is far from efficient and is far more hassle than it is worth, not to mention having to provide information regarding the principal, which I always kept hidden as much as practicable. The local companies would often provide ‘spare weapons’ in the vehicles.
Ultimately, it is the ‘former government’ exposure aspect that I look for in local attachments and provision. This is the main foundation in any requirement.
5. Even though proactivity and preparation are pillars of close protection, obviously, at times, not every detail goes as planned and bad actors can emerge unexpectedly. Having done protection for high-profile individuals in the UK, how does not being able to carry even a baton for protection change the way you approach the operation?
UK law, and elsewhere, for that matter, is an issue that underpins the gravity of providing protection within the private sector. As we are currently witnessing with the Sussexes saga and their lobbying for police protection, you can only really meet a threat like for like if you have the same tools at your disposal. If you do not, you are not playing on a level battlefield, and the advantage will always play into the hands of the aggressor.
Yet, firearms, sprays, batons- they are only tools to be used, and even in hostile environments within a protection operation, they are tools not often used. The issue with the commercial/ private sector in the UK, for instance, and the manner in which the industry works is such that most CP requirements are conducted as a ‘life-smoother’, as a form of insurance/ warm fuzzy feeling for the client, not as a result of any directed threat against them. Most are also not instantly recognisable walking down the streets of Mayfair. Protection then is provided more so as a means to counter a generic threat that we all may experience walking in Mayfair; street mugging, knife threats in the main at the far end of the scale.
The knock-on effect that UK CP and much elsewhere experiences then is such that when the potential for real danger in the UK on a day-to-day basis, although present, seldom arises, this gives the individual providing the service a false sense of ability and true market worth. It also provides the client with a false sense of security and a false impression that the service he/she has received has been excellent in every sense of the word, including proper assessment of, and preparations for, risk mitigation. And this is the untold danger of poor standards.
