News broke out of a Guadalajara restaurant shooting, leaving three people dead and four wounded in the Mexican metropolis. Government official Salvador Llamas Urbina was killed by a person eating alongside him at the said diner. Llamas Urbina was a political party national adviser and head of the Municipal Cabinet of Puerto Vallarta. Moreover, it seems that additional attackers assisted the primary assailant in implementing the attack.
A few of the people who found themselves near the Guadalajara restaurant shooting fell victim. Among them were also Fernando Muñoz, former Security Commissioner of Puerto Vallarta — and one of the assailants. As the authorities are trying to establish what has actually happened, it seems that the attack was planned, and the victims were targeted.
Some media assert that law enforcement has found iron devices in the nearby street. In fact, experts claim that aggressors used these to puncture tiers of police cars in order to make them slower in responding.
To get a better insight, we asked Ivan Ivanovich from Mexico to weigh in on this incident!
Ivan Ivanovich, Worldwide Security Options
Three abandoned vehicles were found outside the Sonora Grill, where the attack occurred. Inside, weapons, punctured tires, and other evidence were found.
It has not been easy to reconstruct the facts due to the confusion of the information. However, we may conclude that the executive had at least five escorts. These include Captain Francisco Muñoz (who tried to repel the attack), who was outside the restaurant, while Llamas ate with his killer.
As in other cases, the tragic scheme is perpetuated in which all protection is reduced to armed escorts. This is an approach that seldom produces results.
Once again, unfortunately, we realized that an armed and numerous operation is not necessarily effective, but rather the opposite. Resources were not lacking, but the knowledge to protect the official’s life was.
Knowing the protective logistics, making the protectors operate in a different scheme, and prioritizing counter-surveillance, early warning, and non-conventional protection are factors that would have made a difference. Only a radical change in the way of operating can make this profession safer for both the protected and the protectors.